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If we drop it from the intial pass, I'd like for it to move to a "security considerations" section noting the remaining risk, and suggesting that browsers may/should want to close that gap in the future.
In the end, I'm not sure it makes sense to remove from the spec right now. In Chromium, local -> loopback (fka private -> local) fetches from non-secure contexts were exempted from deprecation due to rollout difficulties, but they are subject to preflights when sent from secure contexts. It seems better to just have a Chromium bug to track eventually implementing the spec than amending the spec to reflect Chromium's current limitation?
I think adding a warning in the specification that points to this issue reminding people about potential deployment difficulties might be good, but overall that sounds reasonable.
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mikewest commentedon Jan 13, 2023
If we drop it from the intial pass, I'd like for it to move to a "security considerations" section noting the remaining risk, and suggesting that browsers may/should want to close that gap in the future.
letitz commentedon Jan 13, 2023
Good idea! Mentioning it in the spec means we can avoid having another issue laying around.
I was thinking of saying that private -> local being blocked could be up to the user agent, but if no user agent does that, it's maybe misleading?
mikewest commentedon Jan 13, 2023
I'd think of this more like Cookie's documentation of known flaws/gaps (e.g. https://httpwg.org/http-extensions/draft-ietf-httpbis-rfc6265bis.html#section-8). "Hey, this is a thing that we know about, but haven't addressed yet. User agents should feel free to come up with clever ways of addressing it."
letitz commentedon Jan 13, 2023
Fair enough!
letitz commentedon Mar 2, 2023
In the end, I'm not sure it makes sense to remove from the spec right now. In Chromium, local -> loopback (fka private -> local) fetches from non-secure contexts were exempted from deprecation due to rollout difficulties, but they are subject to preflights when sent from secure contexts. It seems better to just have a Chromium bug to track eventually implementing the spec than amending the spec to reflect Chromium's current limitation?
annevk commentedon Mar 2, 2023
I think adding a warning in the specification that points to this issue reminding people about potential deployment difficulties might be good, but overall that sounds reasonable.
Call out local -> loopback challenges.
Call out local -> loopback challenges.